








In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object  which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields three versions of endurantism, of which I ultimately defend the version I call universalist endurantism. Universalist endurantism is the thesis that (i) for any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples that exist at the same instant, there exists a fusion of the members of S, and (ii) for any arbitrary set S* of instantaneous fusions each of which exist at a different instant, there exists an enduring object O that is constituted by those fusions at those instants. Universalist endurantism is ‘non-mereological’ in that the relation that holds between instantaneous fusions and persisting objects is not the part/whole relation, but rather, is the relation of constitution, thus allowing that the persisting objects are three rather than four dimensional. I argue that universalist endurantism not only has the various benefits of mereological universalism in allowing vagueness to be explicated as semantic indeterminacy, but in addition allows the endurantist to hold that some properties are genuinely intrinsic and are exemplified simpliciter. 

Two of the big questions in metaphysics are (1) “given that we agree about the distribution of the most primitive particulars—call them simples— what, if anything, is composed of those simples: that is, what non-basic concrete particulars exist?”​[1]​ and (2) “of the things that exist, how do the ones that exist at two or more different times persist?”​[2]​ Broadly speaking, there are three possible answers to the first question. On one view, every way of arranging simples at times composes some composite persisting object. Call this the view that composition is unrestricted. Another answer to the first question is that no way of arranging simples composes any object. All that exists are mereological simples: there are no mereologically composite objects. Call this view m-compositional​[3]​ nihilism.​[4]​ The third answer to the first question is that some ways of arranging simples compose a composite object, and some other ways do not. Call this the view that composition is restricted.​[5]​ 

It is generally agreed that there are two answers to the second question regarding the  manner in which objects persist: three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism. Three dimensionalism is the view that persisting objects have only spatial dimensions and thus are wholly present at every time at which they exist. Thus for any two times t and t* at which a three dimensional object O exists, O is wholly present at both t and t*, and is strictly identical at each of these times. Three dimensional objects persist by enduring, and the view is therefore sometimes known as endurantism. Four dimensionalism is the view that persisting objects have a fourth temporal dimension: they are temporally extended. Most frequently it is the view that only a part of a persisting object—a temporal part—exists at any time. This most common version of four dimensionalism then, is perdurantism, the view that objects persist by perduring: by being the mereological fusion of distinct temporal parts. 

In this paper I will be concerned with the first answer to the question “what things exist?”: the view according to which composition is unrestricted. This view is typically understood in mereological terms,​[6]​ as the claim that for every set S whose members are concrete particulars, there is a mereological fusion of the members of S, where x is a fusion of the members of S just if every member of S is part of x, and every part of x overlaps some member of S. Call this view mereological universalism. Now, so long as we think that our world is one in which there exist multiple particulars, at least some of which do not overlap, that is, do not share any parts, then mereological universalism guarantees that at least in some cases, something like perdurantism is true. For it guarantees that if there is some object O that exists from t—t5, and some object O* that exists from t7—t10,  then there is some third object F that is the fusion of O and O*. Since by definition a fusion is an object that has as parts each of the particulars it fuses, the object F is surely a four dimensional object in that it is only partly present at each time at which it exists, in virtue of one of its parts (O and then O*), being present at each of those times. Although mereological universalism does not rule out that O and O* are themselves enduring objects and thus wholly present whenever they exist, it turns out that there is some further object F that has these objects as temporal parts. 

So long as we think that there exist some non-overlapping objects, as surely we do, mereological universalism entails that at least some objects perdure. Those endurantists who find the idea of temporal parts and perdurantism repugnant, will, therefore, want to reject mereological universalism. This general worry about the fusion of non-overlapping objects is made even more pressing for endurantists if the simplest particulars turn out to be instantaneous.  For if mereological universalism is true, then for any time t and any simples that exist at t, there exists a fusion of those simples. Let us call a fusion of instantaneous simples all of which exist at the same time, a synchronic fusion. Then mereological universalism guarantees that for any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples all of which exist at the same time, there exists some synchronic fusion of those members. Then it follows that for any arbitrary set S whose members are synchronic fusions, there exists a fusion of the members of S. Thus for any arbitrary set S whose members are synchronic fusions each of which exists at a different instant, there will exist some fusion of the members of S. Call such an object a diachronic fusion. Then a diachronic fusion is an ‘across time’ fusion of instantaneous objects—synchronic fusions. So a diachronic fusion is a traditional perduring object: it is the fusion of synchronic fusions, better known as temporal parts, and is therefore only partly present whenever it exists. 

Hence if one accepts that the simplest particulars are instantaneous, and one also accepts mereological universalism, this entails that one is committed to the view that objects persist by perduring. It does not seem, however, that the combination of the view that the simplest particulars are instantaneous, with the loosely defined view of unrestricted composition according to which every arrangement of particulars at times composes some persisting object, ought to entail that objects are four dimensional and persist by perduring. Indeed, in this paper I will argue that there is a non-mereological version of universalism that allows the combination of these views without committing one to perdurantism. 

This paper, then is by way of being what we might think of as advice to endurantists, or at least, those many endurantists who are attracted to some form of unrestricted composition. In attempting to construct a suitable non-mereological universalism, I will consider a number of different versions of endurantist non-mereological universalism. Ultimately I defend just one of these. I argue that the combination of non-mereological universalism with the view that simples are instantaneous, the view I will call universalist endurantism, has considerable metaphysical flexibility in dealing with many of the problems of change over time. Further, I will argue that this view is superior to either of the endurantist views according to which the simplest particulars endure. 

That is to say, my advice to endurantists wishing to embrace unrestricted composition, is that they ought to embrace endurantist universalism. This is not to say that some of the other non-mereological views might not also have some positive features, to which some endurantists might be attracted: it is not to rule out any of these non-mereological views as possible ones that the endurantist might embrace. It is merely to note that given the sorts of theoretical constraints common to many endurantists, it is likely that endurantist universalism will find most favour. 

Another matter to note: this paper addresses itself primarily to the endurantist.  In developing the various non-mereological universalisms and then defending endurantist universalism, I also develop some novel endurantist responses to various problems of change, including the problem of temporary intrinsics. I claim, with respect to these novel solutions, only that they are at the very least equally as good as the current endurantist accounts. So I claim only the endurantist who wishes to embrace unrestricted composition and hence, following my advice, endurantist universalism, is certainly no worse off than his fellow endurantists. It seems to me he is in fact somewhat better off, but in matters of temporary intrinsic properties, one man’s better is another man’s worse. What I do not claim is that endurantist universalism is a better account than, say, perdurantism, or that perdurantists ought to be moved to change their position. I claim only that those already committed to an endurantist account of persistence ought to find much in the account I defend, not only insofar as it makes coherent the combination of endurantism and unrestricted composition, but insofar as it provides a novel account of temporary intrinsics that provides resources not available within any of the current endurantist accounts. 










So far I have pointed out that combining the view that simples are instantaneous with the thesis of mereological universalism, entails that objects persist by perduring. But so what, the endurantist might say. Unless some empirical discovery suggests that simples are instantaneous, there is no reason to suppose that they are so. And if simples persist, then surely they endure. So let us assume what perhaps most endurantists will, that the most basic simples endure. Further, let us assume that composition is unrestricted, and let us understand that as the claim that mereological universalism is true. And let us put aside for a moment the problem of what the endurantist should say about fusions of non-overlapping enduring objects. For illustrative purposes, let us conceive of a world W in which there exists just three enduring simples A, B and C. Let us suppose that A endures from t0 to t5, B endures from t1 to t6, and C endures from t2 to t7. In W then, there exist four fusions: AB, AC, CB, and ABC. Notice that the fusion of A and B exists from t0 to t6, and thus there are times when only one member of the fusion exists, namely t0 at which only A exists, and t6 at which only B exists. 

In this world then, there exist no synchronic fusions, for there exist no instantaneous objects, and thus no way to create instantaneous fusions. It therefore follows that there exist no perduring objects in this world, since, given a traditional account of perdurantism, perduring objects are those persisting objects that are composed at each time at which they exist, of some instantaneous object—an instantaneous temporal part—at that time. Since no such instantaneous objects exist, no such instantaneous temporal parts exist. Indeed, more generally, it is not true with respect to the world in question, that for any arbitrary temporal interval, there exists some persisting object whose temporal extent fills that and only that interval. So even a non-traditional perdurantism that is absent a commitment to instantaneous temporal parts, is not a perdurantism to be found in this world. 

So if we supposed that persisting objects either endure or they perdure, then it follows that the objects in this world endure. Of course, one might doubt that claim, in which case let us stipulate that the persisting objects in world W endure. 

Whereas the endurantist talks of  enduring objects having parts at times, it is natural to talk of these fusions having parts tenselessly. It is tenselessly true of the fusion AB, that B is part of AB. If AB is indeed an enduring object, however, the endurantist will surely want to talk of the parts of a fusion at a time. She will want to say, for instance, that at t0, the fusion AB has A as a spatial part, and that at t1 the fusion AB has both A and B as spatial parts. In order to make sense of this then, we need to be able to talk of the parts at a time, of a fusion simpliciter. Since the fusion AB is a fusion of objects that are each wholly present whenever they exist, this ought be possible. To explicate this, I will use the locution of ‘the parts of a fusion at a time’. By a ‘fusion at a time’ , I intend to refer to all of the members of the fusion simpliciter, which exist at the time in question. Thus the fusion of ABC tenselessly has enduring objects A, B and C as parts. However, at t7 out of A, B and C, only C exists. Thus at t7 the fusion at a time of ABC has only one spatial part, C. 

Moving on then, let us suppose further that in W there is some object, call it O, that exists between t2 and t5. O has spatial parts A and B at t2, B and C at t3,  A and C at t4, and A, B and C at t5. O then, is a perfectly ordinary object in that it has different spatial parts at different times. Notice that O is not a fusion of enduring simples. It has as spatial parts A, B and C, but the fusion of A, B and C is an object that exists between t0 and t7, and which considered at each time between t2 and t5, has as spatial parts A, B and C at each of those times.  The question then, is what is the relation between O and the various fusions that exist in W?​[7]​

Fortunately, endurantists have already defined a relation that holds between two enduring objects that are materially coincident at a time, namely the relation of constitution. Although there are many different variations on the definition of the constitution relation, endurantists agree that it is the relation that holds between enduring objects that are materially coincident at a time. There are a number of issues to be considered with respect to the constitution relation, including whether the relation is symmetric or asymmetric, and we will consider these matters in section 4. For now let us provisionally say that x and y are related by constitution at t, where being related by constitution is neutral between the relation being symmetric or asymmetric, just if x and y are wholly present at t, and if x and y are materially coincident at t. 

Then the endurantist will say that at t2, O is constituted by the fusion AB, and at t3 is constituted by the fusion BC, and at t4 is constituted by the fusion AC and so forth. So we might say that O is constituted at times, by fusions. What is interesting about world W then, is that we have two different sorts of enduring objects: we have enduring objects that are fusions of enduring simples, and we have an enduring object that is constituted by fusions at times. To distinguish the two, call the former an enduring fusion, and the latter an enduring non-fusion. This raises an interesting question, namely, which enduring non-fusions exist in W? Presumably a usual proponent of mereological universalism thinks that all composite objects are fusions, and thus thinks that the loose idea of unrestricted composition is captured by mereological universalism. What we see in W though, is that there are enduring objects that are not fusions. The spirit of unrestricted composition is that every arrangement of objects at times composes some enduring object. But then given that O exists in W, it is tempting to argue that many other enduring non-fusions also exist in W. For instance, why does O* not also exist, where O* is constituted by AB at t0 and t1, ABC at t2 and AC at t3? It is tempting to say then, that the spirit of unrestricted composition is captured by the claim that not only do each of the fusions of A, B and C exist in W, but so too do each of the enduring objects that are constituted by those fusions at times. This suggests a version of non-mereological universalism I will call type 1 non-mereological universalism. This is the thesis that (i) for any arbitrary set S of enduring simples there exists some fusion of the members of that set and (ii) for any arbitrary set S of fusions and any arbitrary times at which those fusions exist, there exists some enduring object that is constituted by those fusions at those times.

Let us call the view that embraces type 1 non-mereological universalism profligate endurantism. Given profligate endurantism, we can affirm the existence of O* in W. I call the view ‘profligate’, however, because clause (i) does not place any restriction on which fusions of enduring simples exist. In world W this makes no difference, since there is at least one time in W at which each of the simples exist. Now, since simples do not overlap in the sense of sharing a part in common, let us say that two enduring simples temporally overlap just if there is some time t at which both simples exist. Then given profligate endurantism, if there is some world in which there exist temporally non-overlapping simples or non-overlapping fusions, it follows that there exists a further fusion of those objects that has each of them as parts—temporal parts. Since it is likely indeed that our world is just such a world, it follows that profligate endurantism entails that there exist both enduring and perduring objects. 

To rule out these perduring objects, we could formulate a different version of non-mereological universalism—call it type 2 non-mereological universalism, such that (i) for any arbitrary set S of temporally overlapping enduring simples, there exists a fusion of the members of S and (ii) for any arbitrary set S of fusions, and any arbitrary times at which those fusions exist, there exists some enduring object that is constituted by those fusions at those times. Call the version of endurantism that adopts type 2 non-mereological universalism restrained  endurantism. Since restrained endurantism rules out any fusions of temporally non-overlapping simples, it rules out the possibility of four dimensional objects.





What is the endurantist to make of a world in which simples are instantaneous? As I noted earlier, the endurantist is faced with a problem if she combines the view that simples are instantaneous with an understanding of unrestricted composition in terms of mereological universalism. For persisting objects will turn out to be diachronic fusions: fusions of synchronic fusions each of which exists at a different time. Thus persisting objects will be four dimensional perduring objects. And yet the more general claim of unrestricted composition—the claim that any arrangements of simples at times composes some persisting object—does not in itself seem inconsistent with the idea that simples are instantaneous. In fact, the idea that the claim that any way of arranging instantaneous simples at and across time, is inconsistent with the claim that persisting objects endure, seems  implausible on the face of it. 

Can we reconcile unrestricted composition with the view that simples are instantaneous? We can. The first step is to draw a clear distinction between fusing instantaneous objects at a time—synchronic fusions—and fusing instantaneous objects at different times—diachronic fusions. The distinction between fusing at a time and across time is clear cut here. Moreover, given  endurantism, it is a principled distinction. For endurantists are committed to the claim that there is something substantially different about the way an object persists through time, and the way it extends through space: it is precisely the fact that perdurantists view persistence through time as analogous to extension through space that endurantists find repugnant. 

So the endurantist is in a good position to argue that although any arbitrary instantaneous simples that exist at a time can be fused to create a synchronic fusion, the same is not true for fusions of simples across time. So the endurantist can hold that only the following is true: (i) for any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples all of which exist at the same instant, there exist some fusion of the members of S. Thus there will exist no fusions of simples that do not temporally overlap, that is, fusions that exist at different times. Hence there will exist no diachronic fusions. The universalist aspect of this view must then be introduced via some version of non-mereological universalism. Indeed, matters are considerably more straightforward in this case, since there is no worry about how an enduring object O can be constituted by an enduring fusion at a time. In this case, we can define the non-mereological aspect of thesis in terms of the relation that holds between synchronic fusions and enduring objects. 

That is, we can say that at any time t at which an enduring object O exists, it is at that time constituted by a synchronic fusion. We can then define a new version of non-mereological universalism—call it type 3 non-mereological universalism such that (i) or any arbitrary set S of instantaneous simples all of which exist at the same instant, there exist some synchronic fusion of the members of S and (ii) for any arbitrary set S of synchronic fusions each of which exists at a different time, there is some enduring object O that is at each of those times, constituted by one of those fusions. The version of endurantism that embraces type 3 non-mereological universalism then, will be called universalist endurantism.

To illustrate, let us consider a world W* in which at t1 there exist the instantaneous simples X, Y, and Z, and at t2 there exist the simples P and Q. Given clause (i) it follows that there exists some synchronic fusion O1 that exists at t1 and is the fusion of X, Y and Z, and that there is another synchronic fusion O2 that exists at t2 and is the fusion of P and Q. But where the perdurantist who understands unrestricted composition in terms of mereological universalism will hold that there exists some diachronic fusion O* of O1 and O2 that has each of these objects as temporal parts, the universalist endurantist can avail herself of the principle of type 3 non-mereological universalism. Then it follows that there exists some persisting object O that is constituted by O1 at t1, and by O2 at t2. 

The difference between O and O* then, is that O1 and O2 are proper parts of O*, but are not proper parts of O. It is tenselessly true that O1 is a proper part of O*, indeed, O* only exists at t1 in virtue of having a proper part that exists at that time. On the other hand, O1 is not a proper part of O. O does not exist at t1 in virtue of some proper part existing at that time. Rather, O exists at t1 in virtue of being constituted by some wholly present object at that time. Of course, in the context of a world containing instantaneous simples, the mereological universalist’s and the universalist endurantist’s pictures of the world are similar in many respects. Both are committed to the existence of the same number of objects, existing for the same duration of time. Both agree that not only are there persisting objects that we call tenors and turnips, but that there is also a persisting object that wholly overlaps a tenor at t, and a turnip at t1. Call this object a tenor-turnip. 

For the perdurantist, a tenor is a four dimensional object that is the fusion of appropriately causally related person-stages, some of which engage in acts of singing. A tenor-turnip is a four dimensional object that is the fusion of two instantaneous objects one of which is also a temporal part of a tenor, and the other of which is a temporal part of a turnip. The universalist endurantist, on the other hand, holds that a tenor  is an enduring object which has particular causal relations to itself at each time at which it exists, and which at each time at which it exists, is related by constitution at those times to some synchronic fusion. The tenor-turnip is also an enduring object that exists at t and t1, and which at t is related by constitution to a synchronic fusion that is also related by constitution at that time to a tenor, and which at t1 is related by constitution to a synchronic fusion that at t1 is also related by constitution to a turnip. 

But what are these odd gerrymandered enduring objects that are constituted at times, by synchronic fusions, and should we believe in them? After all, mereological universalism is often defended against claims of ontological profligacy on the grounds that once we accept the existence of all of the various particulars, commitment to combinations of these particulars involves no additional ontological commitment: it does not involve positing the existence of any additional “stuff.”​[8]​ For the type 3 non-mereological universalist though, enduring objects are not simply the fusion of particulars at times, so, it might be objected, she cannot say that commitment to the existence of such objects involves no additional ontological commitment. So perhaps type 3 non-mereological universalism is more ontologically profligate than mereological universalism. 

There is both a sense in which type 3 non-mereological universalism is more profligate than mereological universalism, and a sense in which it is not. Think of it this way, once there are some synchronic fusions, all the mereological universalist needs is the part/whole relation, and from this he can conclude that there is some object that has each of these fusions as parts. Hence positing the existence of diachronic fusions does not commit us to anything other than the combination of those synchronic fusions. For the universalist endurantist, once there are some synchronic fusions, all we need is the constitution relation and we can conclude that there is some enduring object that is constituted by those fusions. So commitment to the existence of such enduring objects does not involve positing the existence of any “new stuff” but merely to the various arrangements of  synchronic fusions. 

But there is a genuine difference between the ontological commitments of these two accounts. For let us consider again the objects O and O*, where O is an enduring object constituted by O1 at t1 and O2 at t2, and O* is a perduring object that is the fusion of O1 and O2. Given mereological universalism, at t1 there exists just one object: O1. Of course, there is a sense in which O* exists at t1, but only the sense in which O1 exists at t1 and O1 is part of O*. Given type 3 non-mereological universalism though, how many objects exist at t1? Well O1 exists at t1, and so too does O. For O1 and O are both wholly present whenever they exist. Hence two distinct objects exist at t1. Of course, O exists at t1 only because it is constituted by O1 at t1, but nevertheless, it is true that there exist two objects at t1 rather than merely one.

The universalist endurantist has to concede this point. There is a genuine sense in which her ontology, committed as it is to type 3 non-mereological universalism, is no more ontologically profligate than that of the mereological universalist, for each countenances the same number and kind of objects. There is, however, another sense in which we might think that type 3 non-mereological universalism is more ontologically profligate that its mereological counterpart, for the type 3 non-mereological universalist must concede that at any time t, there exist multiple, coincident, wholly present objects. But this is a minimal sense of ontological profligacy. After all, O supervenes on O1 at t1, for O1 constitutes O at t1. 

So perhaps if one were not antecedently committed to either endurantism or perdurantism, these considerations might militate in favour of mereological rather than type 3 non-mereological universalism. But that type 3 non-mereological universalism commits one to holding that there exist multiple wholly present objects at the same time and place can hardly be considered a drawback as far the endurantist is concerned. For in general endurantists are committed to holding that at least in some cases distinct enduring objects can be materially coincident at a time: take me and my body, or the statue and the lump of clay as examples. 

So far though, I have said nothing about why one who is committed to some form of unrestricted composition should prefer universalist endurantism over either profligate or restrained endurantism. In section 5 I will consider some of the benefits that universalist endurantism has over either of its two rivals. First, however, since all three views rely on some version of non-mereological universalism, and this notion in turn relies on the relation of constitution, it will be as well to consider further the constitution relation. It is to this that I turn in the following section. 

4 The Constitution Relation

It is the constitution relation that provides the non-mereological component of all versions of non-mereological universalism. But this is a controversial relation: some deny that there is  any relation of constitution,​[9]​ while others hold that if there is such a relation, then it is the relation of sharing a temporal part at a time.​[10]​ Endurantists also disagree as to the nature of this relation, or more specifically, while often agreeing about which objects constitute which other objects, they disagree about how to define the relation in order to capture all of the relevant folk intuitions. In general, endurantists hold that the constitution relation is an asymmetric relation that holds between materially coincident enduring objects that exist at different levels of an ontological hierarchy such that objects that are lower on the hierarchy constitute objects that are higher on the hierarchy.​[11]​ Most endurantists want to say, for instance, that statues are constituted by the lumps of clay with which they materially coincide, but that lumps of clay are not constituted by statues. 

As defined by many endurantists then, the constitution relation holds only between materially coincident non-gerrymandered objects. For regardless of the particulars of the analysis, what determines the direction of the relation are various facts about the persistence conditions of the objects involved. Only once we know various counterfactuals about the objects in question, specifically what sorts of events they can and cannot survive, is it possible to know which is the constituted and which the constituter. Given that gerrymandered objects do not seem to have the relevant modal properties to determine these persistence conditions, typical endurantist analyses of constitution will tell us that materially coincident objects of this sort are not related by constitution. 

Clearly then, the advocate of non-mereological universalism will not want to adopt any of the usual accounts of the constitution relation, for she wants to define constitution in a loose manner, as the relation that holds between any two materially coincident enduring objects at a time. The simplest analysis of the constitution relation then, would be to say that it is a symmetric relation that holds between any two materially coincident enduring objects at the time at which they coincide. Hence:
(S) x constitutes y at t iff x and y are materially coincident at t, and x and y are wholly present at t.

So our enduring object O is constituted by the synchronic fusion O1 at t1, but in addition,  O1 is constituted by O at t1.  Similarly, in a case where we have fusions of enduring simples, not only will enduring non-fusions be constituted by a fusion at a time, but so too an enduring fusion will be constituted by an enduring non-fusion at a time. Moreover, if the constitution relation is symmetric, then in the more ordinary cases such as the lump and the statue, we will have to say that just as the lump constitutes the statue at t, so too the statue constitutes the lump at t. In each of these cases, however, it seems more natural to say that the enduring object is constituted by a fusion (synchronic or enduring) rather than the reverse.

To define constitution as an asymmetric relation then, we could consider the following:
(A) x constitutes y at t iff: (i) x is a fusion (ii) x exists at t (iii) x and y are materially coincident at t and (iv) x and y are wholly present at t.

Clauses (i) and (ii) in (A) can thus be read such that x is a synchronic fusion that exists at and only at t, or such that x is an fusion simpliciter that exists at times including t. Thus (A) at least preserves the endurantist intuition that there is some sort of ontological hierarchy such that enduring objects are constituted by more “basic” objects at times, though of course in the case of profligate or restrained endurantism, the more “basic” objects may pre and post-exist the enduring object that is constituted by them at a times. 

So what then, is the relation that hold between the lump and the statue, or indeed between any two enduring objects that overlap at times. Let us consider again the object O that is constituted by the synchronic fusion O1 at t1 and O2 at t2. Now let us suppose that there exists a synchronic fusion O3 at t3. Then given type 3 non-mereological universalism, it follows that there exists some enduring object, call it O!, that is constituted by O1 at t1, O2 at t2 and O3 at t3. Then both O and O! exist at t1. Much the same will be true for either profligate or restrained endurantism, where two or more enduring non-fusions will be constituted by the same fusion at a time. We could say that O and O! are related by constitution, and thus amend (A) in the requisite ways. But I do not see that there is much advantage to be gained by doing so. As (A) stands, we can still explain O and O! being materially coincident at t1 and t2, by noting that at each of these times, they are both constituted by the same fusion.

This does mean that the endurantist must forfeit some of the intuitions that undergird typical accounts of constitution. For it will not be true that lumps constitute statues or that bodies constitute persons. Moreover, since both lumps and statues are themselves constituted by fusions at times, it is not clear that anything can be preserved of the folk intuition that lumps are somehow more ontologically basic than statues. It is not clear to me though, that it is at all feasible to attempt to capture in one relation, all of the various divergent intuitions about the relations between materially coincident enduring objects. It is not even clear that there is any natural hierarchy to be captured: it is at least plausible that the appearance of such a hierarchy is merely the result of various pragmatic considerations in the way the folk view and interact with objects.​[12]​ 

There is one final problem for any of these endurantist accounts. For endurantists typically hold that even in cases where a lump and statue come into and pass out of existence at the same time, the lump and statue are nevertheless distinct objects that are materially coincident at all times at which they exist. The basis for this contention is that the statue and lump have different modal properties, since each could survive different events, and thus by Leibniz’ Law each is distinct. I do not see that any of the versions of endurantism I have been describing can admit that there exists both a statue and a lump that are at all times coincident. For in that case I see no reason why there should not also exist an enduring object, call it C, that is coincident at all times with the enduring object O that is constituted by O1 at t1 and O2 at t2. After all, ontology ought to be independent of human convention, so it cannot be that the statue and lump are distinct objects purely in virtue of the existence of some conventions regarding lumps and statues.  If that is so, then endurantism would be ontologically profligate indeed: for what is to say that there do not exist any number of objects that wholly overlap at all times at which they exist? Moreover, this is clearly not a claim to which the eveyday endurantist wishes to be committed. 

So heere, I think, the endurantist should follow the perdurantist in describing these as cases of contingent identity.​[13]​ There exists but a single object, that has, in the actual world, two different designations which under different circumstances would have referred to two distinct individuals. What is contingent is that the designation “lump” picks out the particular object that it does in the actual world. So what might have been two distinct individuals is, in the actual world, one individual whose dual designations are contingently identical. 

Now that we have clarified the nature of the constitution relation that lies at the heart of non-mereological universalism, I turn in the following section to consider the three versions of endurantism that are universalist in nature. I argue that universalist endurantism is preferable to both other universalist alternatives, and further, that it has much to recommend it over what we might think of “traditional” endurantism. 

5 Why be a Universalist Endurantist?

Why be a universalist endurantist? This question really has two parts: why accept any universalist version of endurantism?; and why accept universalist endurantism over either of its competitors? That is to say, given that one is an endurantist, why adopt universalist endurantism? To go at matters back to front, I begin with the latter question first: why prefer universalist endurantism over profligate or restrained endurantism? 

The first thing to note is that both profligate and restrained endurantism are committed to the peculiar claim that there are two distinct kinds of persisting object, enduring objects that are fusions of enduring simples—enduring fusions—and enduring objects that are constituted by fusions are times—enduring non-fusions. While this is coherent, it is certainly odd, and a little messy. A further criticism to be levelled at profligate endurantism is that it allows that there exist a plethora of perduring composite objects: for it allows that there exists fusions of temporally non-overlapping simples. Let us consider a world W! in which there exist four simples, A, B, C and D. Let us suppose that A and B exist at and only at t1 and t2, while C and D exist at and only at t3 and t4.  Given profligate endurantism them, there exists a fusion of A, B, C and D: call it F. There also exists, among other things, a fusion of A and B, call it AB, and a fusion of C and D, call it CD. The problem for profligate endurantism is not simply that F is a temporally extended object with temporal parts AB and CD. A further worry is that there also exists some enduring object, call it O, that is constituted by AB at t1 and t2, and by CD at t3 and t4. 

This is not only ontologically profligate, but deeply perplexing. For the enduring object O is strictly identical at all times, and thus at t1 and t3. But the perduring object F is only partly present at t1 and t3, and thus not strictly identical at each of those times. The entire four dimensional object F is strictly identical with itself. Thus at t1 we appear to have two objects, O and F, each composed of the very same enduring simples, yet with radically different properties.​[14]​ 

The third problem for the profligate endurantist is less compelling, and is one that is shared by restrained endurantism. It is the worry that each relies on the somewhat under-defined notion of an enduring object being constituted by an enduring fusion ‘at a time.’ It is not completely clear what it is for an object to be constituted by a fusion at t, where that fusion exists at times other than t.

So let us now turn to consider restrained endurantism.  Unlike profligate endurantism, restrained endurantism rules out the existence of any perduring object by defining type 2 non-mereological universalism in such a way that it does not countenance fusing temporally non-overlapping simples. But it does this at a price. Profligate endurantism is at least uniform: it allows all fusions alike. So too although universalist endurantism is not uniform in that it also rejects the existence of some fusions, it does so in a principled manner. For there is clearly a principled distinction to be made between fusing instantaneous simples all of which exist at the same instant—thus forming a synchronic fusion—and fusing simples that exist at different instants, to form a diachronic fusion. In the case of universalist endurantism the distinction between fusing at a time, and fusing over time, is perfectly clear cut. Not so for the restrained endurantist. Where we have enduring simples, the distinction between at a time and across time fusions is not so cut and dried: for the simples exist at multiple times, and thus the fusion of those simples is an object that exists at multiple times.  It therefore seems more capricious to allow that one can fuse some enduring simples across time, but not others. It is not clear, for instance, why it should be possible to fuse two enduring simples that overlap at one and only temporal location, and not possible to fuse two enduring simples that are temporally contiguous. This is not to say that there is not a distinction to be made between simples that temporally overlap and those that do not, it is merely to notice that the warrant for this distinction is not as clear in this instance as it is with universalist endurantism. 

For all this, restrained endurantism is a workable endurantism. But there is something rather messy about it as an account.  Ultimately then, I think it comes down to a decision between restrained and universalist endurantism.  But perhaps there is no decision to be made here at all. After all, the issue of whether simples are instantaneous or persisting is surely one that cannot be decided at will, but rather awaits empirical discovery. 

There are certainly some empirical discoveries that would, if made, seem to refute the view that simples persist, though given the constraints of relativity such discoveries would amount to empirical evidence that simples are short lived rather than instantaneous. But if there exist spatially partless persisting objects, it is an open question whether those objects endure or perdure, and a question that cannot be answered by reference to empirical discovery. If such spatially partless objects perdure, then mereological simples just are the instantaneous temporal parts of such objects. So the universalist endurantist could maintain that simples are instantaneous even if empirical evidence suggested that spatially partless objects persist. 

Of course the problem for this view is that like profligate endurantism, it concedes that some objects perdure. As I see it though, it is not nearly as counterintuitive as profligate endurantism. For it allows that in general endurantists are right about everyday composite objects: you and I and even odd gerrymandered objects endure. I now am strictly identical to myself at any other time at which I exist. Only some of the more recherche objects, namely spatially partless particulars, turn out to have temporal parts. Furthermore, this view allows one to hold the plausible view that there is some smallest basic building block that is not only mereologically simple, but which also exists for the shortest possible temporal duration: an instant. 

If the endurantist is prepared to accept that such instantaneous simples exist, then there are some additional benefits. For universalist endurantism has an advantage over any other version of endurantism, universalist and non-universalist alike, in that it is able to provide an analysis of property exemplification such that at least some properties turn out to be intrinsic. For there is a well known problem for endurantists. Since any enduring object is strictly identical at any two times at which it exists, if the endurantist holds that each of those times is equally ontologically real—eternalism is true—then no enduring object can exemplify any property simpliciter. For suppose O is wholly red at t, and wholly blue at t*. Since by Leibniz’ Law O must have all of the same properties at t as it does at t*, it would seem that at each of these times, O has the contradictory properties of being both wholly red and wholly blue. 

Endurantists solve this problem by temporally relativising either the properties themselves,​[15]​ such that O is red-at-t, or by relativising the having of those properties,​[16]​ such that O is red tly. Following standard terminology, call the former view indexicalism, and the latter adverbialism.

This analysis of property exemplification has been criticised by many perdurantists on the grounds that it is implausible that objects cannot exemplify any properties simpliciter. For if all properties are disguised relations to times, then no property is ever intrinsic.​[17]​ Here, I want to put aside the adverbial analysis, and consider only the indexical account, for of both accounts, it is the one that is most vulnerable to such a criticism. 

According to perdurantists, an object exemplifies some property simpliciter in virtue of having some temporal part that exemplifies the property simpliciter. So for some persisting object O, ‘O is red’ is true at t just if there is some temporal part of O that is red, that is, if O-at-t is red. Since O-at-t exists only at t and is red at t, O-at-t is red simpliciter. But notice that even for the perdurantist, it is not really true that O is red simpliciter, or that it has the straightforward property of being red. For consider the spatial analog of this case. Considered as a three dimensional object, I might have a spatial part, say an arm, that is blue simpliciter. From that it follows that I, the whole three dimensional object, have the property of having a blue arm. It does not follow that I am blue. So too,  O exemplifies the property of having a part that is red simpliciter. And just as we might say that I have the property of being blue-at-L, where ‘L’ refers to a spatial location, so too one way to express the claim that O has a red temporal part at t, is to say that O is red-at-t: what it is to be red-at-t is to have some part at t that is red simpliciter. 

Now consider what the universalist endurantist will say about property exemplification. Let us consider O again, but this time as an enduring object. For the universalist endurantist there is also an object that exists at and only at t, and which is materially coincident with O at t, and that is the synchronic fusion, call it F, that constitutes O at t. If the enduring object O is red at t, then it is so because the synchronic fusion F is red. Since F is an instantaneous object, it is clearly red simpliciter. So for the universalist endurantist, there is something that has the intrinsic property of being red, namely F. Why is O red at t? Because at t, O is constituted by F. Being red-at-t just is the relational property of being constituted at t, by something that is red simpliciter. 

Thus the universalist endurantist is in a position both to explicate exactly what it is for an enduring object to have a temporally relativised property, and to reject the claim that this analysis of property exemplification leaves no room for intrinsic properties. For both perdurantist and universalist endurantist hold that it is instantaneous objects that have properties simpliciter, and that persisting objects have these properties in virtue of being related to these instantaneous objects in a particular manner: by having them as parts, or by being constituted by them at times. 

So although universalist endurantism might end up being committed to the idea that simples perdure, adopting a metaphysics according to which the most basic objects are instantaneous does offer some benefits. Another benefit of universalist endurantism which is shared with both profligate and restrained endurantism is that like mereological universalism, it allows us to locate vagueness in semantic indeterminacy rather than at the level of ontology.​[18]​

The familiar idea is that all objects have determinate spatial and temporal borders, but that our terms fail to refer uniquely: each term is ambiguous between a number of distinct, but largely overlapping objects. Thus it is not indeterminate at which moment I shall perish, rather, it is indeterminate to which of the determinately existent objects with slightly different temporal borders, my name refers. Now, all universalist versions of endurantism hold that there exist multiple overlapping enduring objects—objects that are constituted by the same fusions at times—that come into existence at the same time but have different temporal extents. Thus they can explicate ‘temporal vagueness’ that is, vagueness regarding the exact time at which an object comes into or ceases to exist, as mere semantic indeterminacy: it is indeterminate to which of the materially coincident enduring objects our linguistic terms refer. 

So too ‘spatial vagueness’ can be explicated in an analogous manner. Cases where it is indeterminate whether some spatial part P is part of O at t,  can be explicated in terms of it being indeterminate to which of two or more objects of slightly different spatial dimensions, our terms refer. For universalist versions of endurantism hold that at any time t, there exist multiple objects most of whose spatial parts at t overlap. Hence any vagueness concerning whether P is part of O at t, is the result of  ‘O’ failing to pick out a unique referent amongst these overlapping objects. 

Considerations of this section suggest that of the three versions of endurantism I examine, universalist endurantism is preferable to either profligate or restrained endurantism. For it is a simple, elegant theory that is metaphysically flexible in a way that neither of its cousins manage. In the following section, however, I will consider whether adopting universalist endurantism presents us with a new set of problems.

6 Semantics for the Non-mereological Universalist

If we adopt universalist endurantism as our preferred brand of endurantism, however, we are faced with what appears to be a problem. For universalist endurantists hold that peculiar objects such as tenor-turnips exist. Let us suppose that a tenor-turnip is an object constituted during interval T, by  synchronic fusions that constitute a turnip, and constituted during T* by synchronic fusions that constitute a tenor. Let us suppose further that interval T and T* are non-overlapping intervals—there is no time t that occurs in both intervals. The existence of objects such as tenor-turnips seems to create something of a problem for traditional three dimensionalist semantics. For consider the sentence

(1) Some tenor was a turnip.

We want this sentence to come out as false. A traditional analysis of the sentence might be:

(2) For some enduring object x, x at t is a tenor and there is some past time t- such that x at t- is a turnip. 

If one rejects any form of universalism, then one can conclude that there is no such object that is in the present a tenor, and was in the past a turnip. So (1) is false. If one is a non-mereological universalist, however, then it may seem that (1) comes out as true: for our tenor-turnip is at t a tenor, and at t- a turnip, so there is an enduring object that is a tenor and was a turnip. Similarly, the sentence

(3) Every tenor was a child

will  come out as false, since there will be some x such that x is an enduring object that at t is a tenor, but which at no past time t- was ever a child. So it will turn out that a great many sentences we take to be true will turn out to be false, and a great many sentences we take to be false will come out as true.​[19]​ 

We should note though, that (2) itself is in need of further analysis. For it turns out that some tenor was a turnip, only if x at t is a tenor, and x at t- is a turnip. We might think that if x is a tenor-turnip, then this is true, since at t x is constituted by the synchronic fusion that constitutes the tenor at t. So we might say that throughout T, x is a turnip, and throughout T* x is a tenor: so a tenor-turnip just is an object that is at some times a tenor and at other times a turnip. 

But what it is to be a turnip? It is to be an enduring object whose parts across time are causally related in a turnip-manner. Exactly what this manner is will depend on how one understands turnip identity over time. While this is presumably fairly straightforward for turnips, it is notoriously difficult for persons. But let us suppose that turnip identity, like personal identity, is whatever out best theory of turnip identity says it is. Then:
x is a turnip iff x is an enduring object that is constituted at each time at which it exists, by synchronic fusions that are causally related in the turnip-manner.
What then, is it to be a tenor? Let us suppose that it is a necessary condition for something to count as a tenor, that it also be a person. Then a tenor is a person who has certain singing abilities. Now let us suppose that personal identity is whatever our best theory of personal identity tells us. Then we can say that:
x is a tenor iff x is an enduring object that is constituted at each time at which it exists by synchronic fusions that are causally related in a person-manner, and which has certain singing abilities.

Now of course there are objects that meet each of these descriptions, namely the object that exists through T and is a turnip, and the object that exists through T* and is a tenor. Then (1), some tenor was a turnip, will be true just if there exists some object that is  constituted by synchronic fusions that are causally related in the tenor-manner, and which is also constituted by synchronic fusions that are causally related in a turnip-manner. But is any person ever constituted by synchronic fusions that also constitute a turnip? No. And it’s hard to see how this could be possible. If one’s theory of personal identity involves, at a minimum, some sort of psychological continuity, and assuming that turnips are never conscious, it is difficult to see how any person could ever be a turnip. 






Unrestricted composition brings with it certain benefits. Those endurantists who wish to avail themselves of something of its spirit, however, will need to avail themselves of some version of non-mereological universalism. Though this introduces a new relation in addition to the part/whole relation of mereology, namely the constitution relation, this ought to come at no cost to most endurantists, who are already committed to the existence of such a relation. 
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